

TIAA-CREF POLICY STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE



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TIAA-CREF POLICY STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

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I. INTRODUCTION – HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The mission of Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) is to “forward the cause of education and promote the welfare of the teaching profession and other charitable purposes” by helping secure the financial future of our participants who have entrusted us with their retirement savings.

TIAA and CREF’s boards of trustees and management have developed investment strategies that are designed to accomplish this mission through a variety of asset classes and risk/reward parameters, including investments in the equity securities of domestic, international and emerging-market companies.

TIAA-CREF is a long-term investor. Whether our investment is in equity, debt, derivatives or other types of securities, we recognize our responsibility to monitor the activities of portfolio companies. We believe that sound governance practices and responsible corporate behavior contribute significantly to the long-term performance of public companies. Accordingly, our mission and fiduciary duty require us to monitor and engage with portfolio companies and to promote better corporate governance and social responsibility.

TIAA-CREF was one of the first institutional investors to engage with companies on issues of corporate governance. During the 1970s and 1980s, the governance movement focused primarily on the protection of shareholder interests in the context of takeovers and contests for control. TIAA-CREF took a leadership role in opposing abusive anti-takeover provisions and management entrenchment devices such as dead-hand poison pills. During the 1990s and following the collapse of the bubble market, governance has focused on director independence, board diversity, board committee structure, shareholder rights, accounting for options and executive compensation disclosure. Most recently, TIAA-CREF has led the movement to establish majority voting in director elections, as set forth in this Policy Statement. Corporate governance standards and best practices are now recognized as an essential means to protect shareholder rights, ensure management and board accountability and promote maximum performance.

TIAA-CREF is also concerned about issues of corporate social responsibility, which we have been addressing for more than three decades. In the 1970s we were one of the first institutional investors to engage in dialogue with portfolio companies on issues of automotive safety in the United States and apartheid policies in South Africa. Since then we have maintained a strong commitment to responsible investing and good corporate citizenship. Recognizing that many of our participants have strong views on social issues, in 1990 we introduced the CREF Social Choice Account to provide an investment vehicle that gives special consideration to social concerns. The Account, which is screened using the KLD Broad Market Social Index, invests only in companies that meet specified environmental and social criteria.

In keeping with our mission and fiduciary duty, TIAA-CREF continues to establish policies and engage with companies on governance, environmental, social and performance issues. We believe that, consistent with their business judgment, companies and boards should: (i) pay careful attention to their governance, environmental and social practices; (ii) analyze the strategic impact of these issues on their business; and (iii) fully disclose their policies and decisions to shareholders. We expect boards and managers to engage constructively with us and other shareholders concerned about these issues.

TIAA-CREF recognizes that corporate governance standards must balance two goals — protecting the interests of shareholders while respecting the duty of boards and managers to direct and manage the affairs of the corporation. The corporate governance policies set forth in this Policy Statement seek to ensure board and management accountability, sustain a culture of integrity, contribute to the strength and continuity of corporate leadership and promote the long-term growth and profitability of the business enterprise. At the same time, these policies are designed to safeguard our rights as shareholders and provide an active and vigilant line of defense against fraud, breaches of integrity and abuses of authority.

This is the fifth edition of this Policy Statement, which is reviewed and revised periodically by the TIAA and CREF boards of trustees. The TIAA and CREF boards have delegated oversight of TIAA-CREF's corporate governance program, including development and establishment of policies, to the joint Committee on Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility, which is composed of independent trustees. This edition reflects current developments in

corporate governance, social and environmental policy, technology, market structure, globalization, cross-border and emerging-market investing and proxy voting. For example, this edition includes new voting guidelines and highlights certain recent watershed events in corporate governance such as (i) adoption of the majority voting standard for director elections; (ii) enhanced disclosure regarding executive compensation as required by new SEC rules; and (iii) evolving research on the economic impact of companies' environmental and social practices.

Although many of the specific policies in this Statement relate primarily to companies incorporated in the United States, the underlying principles apply to all public companies in which TIAA-CREF invests throughout the world. TIAA-CREF's portfolio has become increasingly diversified internationally during the past decade. We have made substantial efforts to promote good corporate governance principles and practices at both the domestic and international level.

TIAA-CREF believes that a company whose board and executive management adopt sound corporate governance principles will set the right "tone at the top" and thereby reinforce an ethical business culture governing all its dealings with customers, employees, regulators and the communities it serves. We view this Policy Statement as the basis for collaborative efforts by investors and companies to promote good corporate governance and to ensure that companies establish the right "tone at the top."

This Policy Statement is intended to inform our clients and participants, portfolio companies, regulators, advocacy groups and other institutional investors about our governance policies. It serves as a basis for dialogue with boards of directors and senior managers. The Policy Statement is posted on our website (www.tiaa-cref.org).

II. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS

As owners of equity securities, shareholders rely primarily on a corporation's board of directors to protect their interests. Unlike other groups that do business with the corporation (e.g., customers, suppliers and lenders), holders of common stock have no clear contractual protection of their interests. Instead, they place their trust in the directors, whom they elect, and use their right to vote at shareholder meetings to ensure the accountability of the board. We

believe that the basic rights and principles set forth below should be guaranteed and should govern the conduct of every publicly traded company.

1. *Each Director Should Represent All Shareholders.* Shareholders should have the right to expect that each director is acting in the interest of all shareholders and not that of a particular constituent, special interest group or dominant shareholder.
2. *One Share, One Vote.* Shareholders should have the right to vote in proportion to their economic stake in the company. Each share of common stock should have one vote. The board should not create multiple classes of common stock with disparate or “super” voting rights, nor should it give itself the discretion to cap voting rights that reduce the proportional representation of larger shareholdings.
3. *Financial Equality.* All shareholders should receive fair and equal financial treatment. We support measures designed to avoid preferential treatment of any shareholder.
4. *Confidential Voting.* Shareholders should be able to cast proxy votes in a confidential manner. Tabulation should be conducted by an Inspector of Election who is independent of management. In a contest for control, it may be appropriate to modify confidentiality provisions in order to ensure the accuracy and fairness of the voting results.
5. *Vote Requirements.* Shareholders should have the right to approve matters submitted for their consideration with a majority of the votes cast. The board should not impose super-majority vote requirements, except in unusual cases where necessary to protect the interests of minority shareholders.

Abstentions should not be included in the vote tabulation, except for purposes of determining whether a quorum is present. Shareholder votes cast “for” or “against” a proposal should be the only votes counted.

The board should not combine or “bundle” disparate issues and present them for a single vote. Shareholders should have the right to vote on each separate and distinct issue.

6. *Authorization and Issuance of Stock.* Shareholders should have the right to approve the authorization of shares of common stock and the issuance of shares for corporate purposes in order to ensure that such actions serve a valid purpose and are consistent with shareholder interests.
7. *Antitakeover Provisions.* Shareholders should have the right to approve any provisions that alter fundamental shareholder rights and powers. This includes poison pills and other antitakeover devices. We strongly oppose antitakeover plans that contain “continuing director” or “deferred redemption” provisions limiting the discretion of a future board to redeem the plan. We believe that antitakeover measures should be limited by reasonable expiration periods.
8. *State of Incorporation.* Many states have adopted statutes that protect companies from takeovers, in some cases through laws that interfere with or dilute directors’ accountability to shareholders. We will not support proposals to reincorporate to a new domicile if we believe the primary objective is to take advantage of laws or judicial interpretations that provide antitakeover protection or otherwise reduce shareholder rights.
9. *Board Communication.* Shareholders should have the ability to communicate with the board of directors. In accordance with SEC rules, companies should adopt and disclose procedures for shareholders to communicate their views and concerns directly to board members.
10. *Ratification of Auditors.* Shareholders should have the right to vote annually on the ratification of auditors.

III. DIRECTOR ELECTIONS – MAJORITY VOTING

As a matter of principle, TIAA-CREF endorses the majority vote standard in director elections, including the right to vote for, against or abstain on director candidates. We believe that the lack of majority voting reduces board accountability and causes shareholder activism to be confrontational and adversarial.

Developed markets outside the United States routinely mandate majority voting along with the right to vote against directors and to convene special meetings.

TIAA-CREF has long practiced an “engagement” model of shareholder activism, characterized by dialogue and private negotiation in our dealings with portfolio companies. We believe that majority voting increases the effectiveness of shareholder engagement initiatives and reduces the need for aggressive tactics such as publicity campaigns, proxy contests, litigation and other adversarial strategies that can be disruptive, time-consuming and costly.

The TIAA and CREF boards have adopted the following policy on director elections:

TIAA-CREF POLICY ON DIRECTOR ELECTIONS

1. Directors should be elected by a majority rather than a plurality of votes cast.*
2. In the election of directors, shareholders should have the right to vote “for,” “against,” or “abstain.”
3. In any election where there are more candidates on the proxy than seats to be filled, directors should be elected by a plurality of votes cast.*
4. To be elected, a candidate should receive more votes “for” than “against” or “withhold,” regardless of whether a company requires a majority or plurality vote.
5. Any incumbent candidate in an uncontested election who fails to receive a majority of votes cast should be required to tender an irrevocable letter of resignation to the board. The board should decide promptly whether to accept the resignation or to seat the incumbent candidate and should disclose the reasons for its decision.
6. The requirement for a majority vote in director elections should be set forth in the company’s charter or bylaws, subject to amendment by a majority vote of shareholders.
7. Where a company seeks to opt out of the majority vote standard, approval by a majority vote of shareholders should be required.

* Votes cast should include “withholds.” Votes cast should not include “abstains,” except that “abstains” should be counted as present for quorum.

IV. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

The board of directors is responsible for (i) overseeing the development of the corporation's long-term business strategy and monitoring its implementation; (ii) assuring the corporation's financial and legal integrity; (iii) developing compensation and succession planning policies; (iv) ensuring management accountability; and (v) representing the long-term interests of shareholders.

To fulfill these responsibilities, the board must establish good governance policies and practices. Good governance is essential to the board's fulfillment of its duties of care and loyalty, which must be exercised in good faith. Shareholders in turn are obligated to monitor the board's activities and hold directors accountable for the fulfillment of their duties.

Board committees play a critical governance role. Boards should constitute both standing and ad hoc committees to provide expertise, independent judgment and knowledge of shareholder interests in the specific disciplines they oversee. The full board should maintain overall responsibility for the work of the committees and for the long-term success of the corporation.

TIAA-CREF will closely monitor board performance, activities and disclosure. We will normally vote in favor of the board's nominees. However, we will consider withholding or voting against an individual director, a committee chair, the members of a committee, or from the entire board in uncontested elections where our trustees conclude that directors' qualifications or actions are questionable and their election would not be in the interests of shareholders. (See "Policy Governing Votes on Directors" on Pages 30 and 31). In contested elections, we will vote for the candidates we believe will best represent the interests of shareholders.

V. BOARD STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES

A. BOARD MEMBERSHIP

1. *Director Independence.* The board should be composed of a substantial majority of independent directors. Director independence is a principle long advocated by TIAA-CREF that is now widely accepted as the keystone of good corporate governance.

The definition of independence should not be limited to stock exchange listing standards. At a minimum, we believe that to be independent a director and his or her immediate family members should have no present or recent employment with the company, nor any substantial connection of a personal or financial nature other than ownership of equity in the company. Independence requirements should be interpreted broadly to ensure there is no conflict of interest, in fact or in appearance, that might compromise a director's objectivity and loyalty to shareholders.

An independent director should not provide services to the company or be affiliated with an organization that provides goods or services to the company if a disinterested observer would consider the relationship "substantial."

Director independence may sometimes be influenced by factors not subject to disclosure. Personal or business relationships, even without a financial component, can compromise independence. Boards should periodically evaluate the independence of each director based on all relevant information and should disclose their findings to shareholders.

2. *Director Qualifications.* The board should be composed of individuals who can contribute expertise and judgment, based on their professional qualifications and business experience. The board should reflect a diversity of background and experience. As required by SEC rules for service on the audit committee, at least one director should qualify as a financial expert. All directors should be prepared to devote substantial time and effort to board duties, taking into account their other professional responsibilities and board memberships.
3. *Director Election.* TIAA-CREF believes that directors should be elected annually by a majority of votes cast, as discussed in Section III. The requirement for annual election and a majority vote in director elections should be set forth in the company's charter or bylaws.
4. *Discretionary Broker Voting.* TIAA-CREF supports the proposal by the New York Stock Exchange to amend NYSE Rule 452, thereby

eliminating the practice of brokers voting “street name” shares for directors in the absence of instructions from their customers.

5. *Director Nomination and Access.* As required by SEC regulations, boards should establish and disclose the process by which shareholders can submit nominations. TIAA-CREF believes that shareholders should have the right to submit resolutions asking companies to establish procedures and conditions for shareholders to place their director nominees on the company’s proxy and ballot.
6. *Director Stock Ownership.* Directors should have a direct, personal and meaningful investment in the common stock of the company. We believe that stock ownership helps align board members’ interests with those of shareholders. The definition of a meaningful investment will vary depending on directors’ individual circumstances. Director compensation programs should include shares of stock or restricted stock. TIAA-CREF discourages stock options as a form of director compensation, as they are less effectively aligned with the long-term interests of shareholders.
7. *Director Education.* Companies should encourage directors to attend education programs offered by the company as well as those offered externally. Directors should also receive training to increase their knowledge and understanding of the company’s businesses and operations. They should enroll in education programs to improve their professional competence and understanding of their responsibilities.
8. *Disclosure of Monetary Arrangements.* Any monetary arrangements between the company and directors outside normal board activities should be approved by the board and disclosed to shareholders. Such monetary arrangements are generally discouraged, as they may compromise a director’s independence.
9. *Other Board Commitments.* To ensure that directors are able to devote the necessary time and energy to fulfill their board responsibilities, companies should establish policies limiting the number of public company boards that directors may serve on. As recommended by listing rules, companies should disclose whether any audit committee member serves on the audit committees of three or more public companies.

B. BOARD RESPONSIBILITIES

1. *Monitoring and Oversight.* In fulfilling its duty to monitor the management of the corporate enterprise, the board should: (i) be a model of integrity and inspire a culture of responsible behavior and high ethical standards; (ii) ensure that corporate resources are used only for appropriate business purposes; (iii) mandate strong internal controls, avoid conflicts of interest, promote fiscal accountability and ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations; (iv) implement procedures to ensure that the board is promptly informed of any violations of corporate standards; (v) through the Audit Committee, engage directly in the selection and oversight of the corporation's external audit firm; and (vi) develop, disclose and enforce a clear and meaningful set of corporate governance principles.
2. *Strategic Business Planning.* The board should participate with management in the development of the company's strategic business plan and should engage in a comprehensive review of strategy with management at least annually. The board should monitor the company's performance and strategic direction, while holding management responsible for implementing the strategic plan.
3. *CEO Selection, Evaluation and Succession Planning.* One of the board's most important responsibilities is the selection, development and evaluation of executive leadership. Strong, stable leadership with proper values is critical to the success of the corporate enterprise. The board, with the active involvement of its compensation committee, should continuously monitor and evaluate the CEO and senior executives, and should establish a succession plan to develop executive talent and ensure continuity of leadership.

The CEO evaluation process should be continuous and should be based on clearly defined corporate strategic goals as well as personal performance goals. Financial and nonfinancial metrics used to evaluate executive performance should be disclosed. Both the nominating and compensation committees, as discussed below, should participate in CEO evaluation and succession planning.

The succession plan should identify high potential executives within the company and should provide them with a clear career development path. Effective succession planning should seek to develop senior managers capable of replacing the CEO whenever the need for change might occur.

4. *Equity Policy.* The board should develop an equity policy that determines the proportion of the company's stock to be made available for compensation and other purposes. The equity policy should be disclosed to shareholders in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A). The policy should establish clear limits on the number of shares to be used for options and other forms of equity grants. The policy should set forth the goals of equity compensation and their links to performance.

C. BOARD OPERATION AND ORGANIZATION

1. *Annual Elections.* All directors should stand for election annually. A classified board structure, particularly in combination with takeover defenses such as a "poison pill" shareholder rights plan, can be a significant impediment to changes in control. Moreover, a classified board structure can limit a board's ability to remove an underperforming director.
2. *Board Size.* The board should be large enough to provide expertise and diversity and allow key committees to be staffed with independent directors, but small enough to encourage collegial deliberation with the active participation of all members.
3. *Executive Sessions.* The full board and each board committee should hold regular executive sessions at which no member of management is present. Executive sessions foster a culture of independence and provide opportunities for directors to engage in open discussion of issues that might be inhibited by the presence of management. Executive sessions can be used to evaluate CEO performance, discuss executive compensation and deal with internal board matters.

4. *Board Evaluation.* The board should conduct an annual evaluation of its performance and that of its key committees. Evaluation criteria linked to board and committee responsibilities and goals should be set forth in the charter and governance policies. In addition to providing director orientation and education, the board should consider other ways to strengthen director performance, including individual director evaluations.
5. *Director Retirement Policy.* Although TIAA-CREF does not support arbitrary limits on the length of director service, we believe boards should establish a formal director retirement policy. A director retirement policy can contribute to board stability, vitality and renewal.
6. *Indemnification and Liability.* Directors should be fully accountable and should not be indemnified for fraud, gross negligence or failure to fulfill their duties of care and loyalty. Exclusive of such extreme conduct, it is appropriate for companies to indemnify directors for liability and legal expenses that arise in connection with their board service.
7. *Role of the Chairman.* In the past, TIAA-CREF has not expressed a preference as to whether the positions of CEO and chairman should be separate or whether a lead or presiding director should be designated. However, in recent years public confidence in board independence has been undermined by an array of scandals, fraud, accounting restatements, options backdating, abuses in CEO compensation, perquisites and special privileges. These issues have highlighted the need for boards to be (and to be perceived as) fully independent, cost conscious, free of conflicts, protective of shareholder interests and capable of objectivity, toughness and independence in their oversight of executive management.

For these reasons we recognize that separation of CEO and chair or appointment of a lead director may be appropriate in certain cases. Accordingly, although we do not have a strict policy, we will generally support appointment of a lead director in cases where the roles of CEO and board chair are not separate.

8. *Committee Structure.* Under existing regulations, boards are required to establish three standing committees — an audit committee, a

compensation committee and a nominating/governance committee — all composed exclusively of independent directors. The credibility of the board will depend in large part on the vigorous demonstration of independence by these standing committees.

Boards should also establish additional committees as needed to fulfill their duties. These may include executive, corporate governance, finance, technology, investment, customers and product, operations and human resources committees.

Each board committee should adopt and disclose to shareholders a charter that clearly sets forth its responsibilities.

Each committee should have the power to hire independent experts and advisors.

Each committee should report to the full board on the issues and decisions for which it is responsible.

Whenever a company is the subject of a shareholder engagement initiative or resolution, the appropriate committee should review the matter and the proposed management response.

■ **Compensation Committee**

The Compensation Committee, composed of independent directors, is responsible for oversight of the company's compensation and benefit programs, including performance-based plans and policies that attract, motivate, retain and incentivize executive leadership to create long-term shareholder value. Committee members should have an understanding of competitive compensation and be able to critically compare the company's plans and practices to those offered by the company's peers. Committee members should be independent-minded, well informed, capable of dealing with sensitive decisions and scrupulous about avoiding conflicts of interest. Committee members should understand the relationship of individual components of compensation to total compensation.

The Compensation Committee should be substantively involved in the following activities:

- Establishing goals and evaluating the performance of the CEO and executive management against those goals;
- Determining the compensation of the CEO and executive management and recommending it to the board for approval;
- Reviewing and approving the company's compensation policies;
- Ensuring that a strong executive team is in place;
- Working closely with the Corporate Governance/Nominating Committee to ensure continuity of leadership and effective succession planning;
- Ensuring the consistency of pay practices at all levels throughout the company;
- Establishing clear compensation metrics and practical incentives that will motivate superior executive performance while avoiding waste and excess, particularly in deferred compensation and perquisites; and
- Ensuring that the company's compensation disclosures meet SEC requirements and explain clearly to investors how pay and performance are linked.

The Compensation Committee may retain independent consultants to provide technical advice and comparative pay data. However, survey-based information is only one of many factors guiding compensation and should be evaluated carefully in the context of each company's circumstances and business goals. The Compensation Committee should be responsible for defining the scope of the consultant's engagement, including pay. In accordance with new SEC rules, the nature and scope of the consultant's work should be disclosed to shareholders.

The Compensation Committee is responsible for preparing the annual Compensation Committee Report and should participate substantively in the preparation of management's Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A). These reports should describe each element of the compensation program and should include sufficient detail relating to the program's rationale, goals and metrics to enable shareholders to understand how compensation is intended to work,

what it costs, how it is linked to the company's performance and how it will create long-term value.

■ **Audit Committee**

The Audit Committee oversees the company's accounting, compliance and risk management practices. It is responsible for ensuring the financial integrity of the business. The Audit Committee operates at the intersection of the board, management, independent auditors and internal auditors. It has sole authority to hire and fire the corporation's independent auditors and to set and approve their compensation.

The Audit Committee should:

- Ensure that the auditor's independence is not compromised by any conflicts;
- Establish limits on the type and amount of nonaudit services that the audit firm may provide to the company;
- Require periodic submission of the audit contract to competitive bids; and
- Limit the company's hiring of employees from the audit firm consistent with legal requirements and be promptly informed when such hiring occurs.

In addition to selecting the independent auditors and ensuring the quality and integrity of the company's financial statements, the Audit Committee is responsible for the adequacy and effectiveness of the company's internal controls and the effectiveness of management's processes to monitor and manage business risk. The internal audit team should report directly to the Audit Committee.

The Audit Committee should also develop policies and establish the means to monitor the company's compliance with ethical, legal and regulatory requirements.

The Audit Committee should establish procedures for employees to communicate directly and confidentially with its members.

■ Corporate Governance/Nominating Committee

The Corporate Governance/Nominating Committee oversees the company's corporate governance practices and the selection and evaluation of directors. The committee is responsible for establishing board structure and governance policies that conform to regulatory and exchange listing requirements and standards of best practice.

The committee's duties include:

- Development of the company's corporate governance principles and committee charters;
- Oversight of director selection, qualifications, training, compensation and continuing education;
- Evaluation of director nominees;
- Determination of board and committee size, structure, composition and leadership;
- Periodic evaluation of board and committee effectiveness and director independence;
- Establishment of procedures for communication with shareholders;
- Working with the Compensation Committee to establish succession planning; and
- Disclosure of these matters to shareholders.

VI. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

As described above, the board through its Compensation Committee, is responsible for ensuring that a compensation program is in place which will attract, retain and incentivize executive management to strengthen performance and create long-term value for shareholders. The Committee, along with executive management, is responsible for providing shareholders with a detailed explanation of the company's compensation program, including the individual components of the program, through disclosure in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) and the board Compensation Committee Report. The compensation program should comply with the Compensation Committee's equity policy and should reflect an understanding of the total cost of executive compensation to shareholders.

In pursuit of these goals, the board should ensure that compensation plans include performance measures aligned with the company's short- and long-

term strategic objectives. The Compensation Committee should ensure that the CD&A provides shareholders with a clear and comprehensive explanation of the company's compensation program, including the design, metrics, structure and goals of the program.

Because TIAA-CREF is a long-term investor, we support compensation policies that promote and reward creation of long-term shareholder value. In our review of compensation plans, we will assess the performance objectives established by compensation committees and the linkage of compensation decisions to the attainment of those objectives.

Executive compensation should be based on the following principles:

1. Compensation plans should encourage employees to increase productivity, meet competitive challenges and achieve performance goals that will lead to the creation of long-term shareholder value.
2. Compensation should be objectively linked to appropriate measures of company performance, such as earnings, return on capital or other relevant financial or operational parameters that are affected by the decisions of the executives being compensated.
3. Compensation should include cash, equity and long-term incentives as appropriate to meet the company's competitive and business goals.
4. Compensation plans should be based on a performance measurement cycle that is consistent with the business cycle of the corporation.
5. Compensation levels and incentives should be based on each executive's responsibilities and achievements as well as overall corporate performance.
6. In addition to being performance based, executive compensation should be reasonable by prevailing industry standards, appropriate to the company's size and complexity, and fair relative to pay practices throughout the company.
7. While Compensation Committees should consider comparative industry pay data, it should be used with caution.
8. Surveys that call for use of stock options inconsistent with the board's equity policy or clearly in excess of levels that can be justified to shareholders should be disregarded.

9. Compensation Committees should work only with consultants that are independent of management.
10. Consistent with SEC requirements, the CD&A should provide shareholders with a plain English narrative analysis of the data that appear in the compensation tables. The CD&A should explain the compensation program in sufficient detail to enable a reasonable investor to calculate the total cost and value of executive compensation, to understand its particular elements, metrics and links to performance, and to evaluate the board's and executive management's underlying compensation philosophy, rationale and goals.
11. Companies should disclose and explain the reasons for any differences in the peer group of companies used for strategic and business purposes and the peer group used for compensation decisions.
12. Compensation plans and policies should specify conditions for the recovery (clawback) of incentive or equity awards based upon reported results that have been subsequently restated and that have resulted in unjust enrichment of named executive officers.

A. EQUITY-BASED COMPENSATION

Oversight of Equity-Based Plans

While equity-based compensation can offer great incentives to management, it can also have great impact on shareholder value. The need for directors to monitor and control the use of equity in executive compensation, particularly stock options, has increased in recent years. Amended rules requiring companies to account for the cost of stock options as an expense on grant date provide an incentive for companies to exercise restraint in the use of options. SEC disclosure guidelines should further deter excesses in equity plans. However, in all cases it is the board of directors that is responsible for oversight of the company's equity compensation programs and for the adequacy of their disclosure.

Composition of Equity-Based Plans

In general, equity-based compensation should be based upon the following principles:

1. The use of equity in compensation programs should be determined by the board's equity policy. Dilution of shareholder equity should be carefully considered and managed, not an unintended consequence.
2. As required by exchange listing standards, all plans that provide for the distribution of stock or stock options should be submitted to shareholders for approval.
3. Equity-based plans should take a balanced approach to the use of restricted stock and option grants. Restricted stock, which aligns the interests of executives with shareholders, permits the value to the recipient and the cost to the corporation to be determined easily and tracked continuously.
4. Equity-based plans should be judicious in the use of stock options. When used inappropriately, option grants can provide incentives for management to focus on the company's short-term stock price rather than long-term performance.
5. When stock options are awarded, a company should consider: (i) performance-based options which set performance hurdles to achieve vesting; (ii) premium options with vesting dependent on a predetermined level of stock appreciation; or (iii) indexed options with a strike price tied to an index.
6. Equity-based plans should specifically prohibit "mega grants," defined as grants to executives of stock options whose value at the time of the grant exceeds a reasonable multiple of the recipient's total cash compensation.
7. Equity-based plans should establish minimum vesting requirements and avoid accelerated vesting.
8. Companies should support requirements for stock obtained through exercise of options to be held by executives for substantial periods of

time, apart from partial sales permitted to meet tax liabilities caused by such exercise. Companies should establish holding periods commensurate with pay level and seniority.

9. Companies should require and specify minimum executive stock ownership requirements for directors and company executives.
10. Backdating of option grants should be prohibited. Issuance of stock or stock options timed to take advantage of nonpublic information with short-term implications for the stock price should also be prohibited.
11. Consistent with SEC guidelines, companies should fully disclose the size of equity grants, their estimated value to recipients and their current and projected cost to the company. Performance goals and hurdle rates should be transparent. Disclosure should include plan provisions that could have a material impact on the number and value of the shares distributed.
12. Disclosure should include information about the extent to which individual managers have hedged or otherwise reduced their exposure to changes in the company's stock price.

B. PERQUISITES

When awarding perquisites to senior executives, the board should be guided by the same principles of reasonableness, fairness, equity and transparency that govern other components of compensation plans. Perquisites can be overly complex, with potential for unintended and excessive value transfer to management and unanticipated costs and public relations problems for the company. Perquisites may be needed for purposes of executive security or efficiency, which should be disclosed. In principle, however, boards should minimize perquisites and give priority to other forms of compensation.

C. SUPPLEMENTAL EXECUTIVE RETIREMENT PLANS

Supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) may be used to supplement "qualified" pension entitlements, but should be reasonable and should not enhance retirement benefits excessively. When designing SERPs, compensation committees should consider the value of SERP

programs as part of an executive's total compensation package. They should also be sensitive to issues of internal pay equity. The following principles should guide the development of SERPs:

1. The eligibility requirements and terms of SERPs to named executive officers should be fully disclosed.
2. The value of the supplemental payment to which each named executive officer is entitled and the total cost of all supplemental plan obligations should be estimated and disclosed.
3. "Constructive credit" may be used to replicate full service credit, but should not exceed it.
4. Lump-sum distributions of SERPs may be appropriate in some circumstances. The discount rate used to calculate the lump-sum value of the pension entitlement should approximate the reinvestment rate available at retirement and should be disclosed.

D. EXECUTIVE CONTRACTS

Overly generous executive employment contracts, retention agreements and severance arrangements can result in excessive wealth transfer and expose the company to liability and unintended costs. The terms of contracts with named executive officers should be disclosed in detail with an estimation of their total cost. Companies should avoid providing by contract excessive perquisites either during employment or in the post-retirement period. Severance agreements should avoid payments to executives when they are terminated for misconduct, gross mismanagement or other reasons constituting a "for cause" termination. As in other areas, reasonableness, competitive practice and full disclosure are requirements, and such contracts should be in the best interest of the company and its shareholders.

VII. TIAA-CREF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROGRAM

TIAA-CREF's corporate governance program is based on our mission to help secure the long-term financial future of our participants. Consistent with this mission and our fiduciary duty to our participants, TIAA-CREF

is committed to engagement with portfolio companies for the purpose of creating economic value, improving long-term performance and reducing financial and reputational risks.

A. ENGAGEMENT POLICY AND PRACTICES

Our preference is to engage privately with portfolio companies when we perceive shortcomings in their governance (including environmental and social issues) or their performance. This strategy of “quiet diplomacy” reflects our belief that informed dialogue with board members and senior executives, rather than public confrontation, will most likely lead to a mutually productive outcome.

TIAA-CREF’s Corporate Governance Group administers a program of active monitoring and engagement with portfolio companies under the auspices of the standing trustee Committees on Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility.

We target portfolio companies for engagement based on research and evaluation of their governance and performance. Governance reviews are supplemented by analysis of companies’ financial condition and risk profile conducted in conjunction with our Asset Management Group.

In prioritizing issues for engagement, we take into account their materiality, their potential impact on TIAA-CREF’s investment performance, their relevance to the marketplace, the level of public interest, the applicability of our policies, the views of TIAA-CREF’s participants and institutional clients and the judgment of our trustees.

Our preference is for constructive engagement strategies that can utilize private communication, minimize confrontation and attain a negotiated settlement. While quiet diplomacy remains our core strategy, particularly for domestic companies, TIAA-CREF’s engagement program involves many different activities and initiatives, including the following:

- submit shareholder resolutions
- withhold or vote against one or more directors
- request other investors to support our initiative

- engage in public dialogue and commentary
- conduct a proxy solicitation
- engage in collective action with other investors
- support an election contest or change of control transaction
- seek regulatory or legislative relief
- commence or support litigation
- pursue other enforcement or compliance remedies

B. PROXY VOTING

Proxy voting is a key component of TIAA-CREF's oversight and engagement program. It is our primary method for exercising our shareholder rights and influencing the behavior of portfolio companies. TIAA-CREF commits substantial resources to making informed voting decisions in furtherance of our mission and in compliance with the securities laws and other applicable regulations.

TIAA-CREF's voting policies, established by the trustees and set forth in this Policy Statement (Appendix A), are administered on a case-by-case basis by the staff of our Corporate Governance Group. The staff has access to research reports from third-party advisory firms, seeks input from our Asset Management Group and, where appropriate, confers directly with trustees. Annual disclosure of our proxy votes is available on our website and on the website of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

C. INFLUENCING PUBLIC POLICY AND REGULATION

1. TIAA-CREF periodically publishes its policies on corporate governance, shareholder rights, social responsibility and related issues. These policies inform portfolio companies and provide the basis for our engagement activities.
2. TIAA-CREF participates in the public debate over issues of corporate governance and responsible corporate behavior in domestic and international markets.

3. TIAA-CREF participates in membership organizations and professional associations that seek to promote good corporate governance and protect shareholder rights.
4. TIAA-CREF sponsors research, hosts conferences and works with regulators, legislators, self-regulatory organizations, and other institutional investors to educate the business community and the investing public about governance and shareholder rights.
5. TIAA-CREF submits written comments on regulatory proposals and testifies before various governmental bodies, administrative agencies and self-regulatory organizations.
6. TIAA-CREF participates in corporate governance conferences and symposia in the United States and abroad.

D. DIVESTMENT

TIAA-CREF is committed to engagement with companies rather than divestment of their securities. This policy is a matter of principle that is based on several considerations: (i) divestment would eliminate our standing and rights as a shareholder and foreclose further engagement; (ii) divestment would be likely to have negligible impact on portfolio companies or the market; (iii) divestment could result in increased costs and short-term losses; and (iv) divestment could compromise our investment strategies and negatively affect our performance. In addition, divestment is not an option in segments of our portfolio that track market indices, as we are required to invest in all companies included in an index. For these reasons, we believe that divestment does not offer TIAA-CREF an optimal strategy for changing the policies and practices of portfolio companies, nor is it the best means to produce long-term value for our participants.

As a matter of general investment policy, TIAA-CREF's trustees and its Asset Management Group may consider divesting or underweighting a company's stock from actively managed accounts in cases where they conclude that the financial or reputational risks from a company's policies or activities are so great that continued ownership of its stock is no longer prudent.

VIII. INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

With an increasing share of our assets invested in equities of companies listed on foreign markets and with international holdings in over 50 countries, TIAA-CREF is recognized as one of the most influential investors in the world. We have a long history of acting on behalf of our participants to improve corporate governance standards globally. Our international governance activities, like our domestic program, are designed to protect our investments, reduce risk and increase shareholder value. We focus our governance efforts in those foreign markets where we currently have, or expect to have in the future, significant levels of capital at risk.

We believe that no matter where a company is located, once it elects to access capital from the public it becomes subject to basic principles of corporate governance. We recognize that companies outside the United States are subject to different laws, standards and customs. We are mindful that cultural differences must be respected. At the same time, we recognize our responsibility to promote global governance standards that help strengthen shareholder rights, increase accountability and improve the performance of portfolio companies.

TIAA-CREF has endorsed many of the governance standards of international associations and shareholder organizations. We agree with the widely-held view that harmonization of international governance principles and standards of best practice is essential to achieve efficiency in the global capital markets. Accordingly, our governance initiatives in less developed countries seek to deal with the following problems:

- Listed companies dominated by controlling shareholders often blend characteristics of private and public companies, giving management and insiders too much power and shareholders too little.
- Foreign governments retain ownership in many local listed companies and exercise special powers that interfere with capital market efficiency.
- Shareholder rights are not fully developed in many countries, increasing investment risk.
- Legal and regulatory systems are still underdeveloped and means of enforcement can often be lacking.

- Basic governance standards of board accountability and independence, full and timely disclosure and financial transparency are in many cases still only aspirational.
- Operational inefficiencies such as share blocking and clustering of shareholder meetings impede investor communications and proxy voting.
- Ambivalence about shareholder activism, control contests and takeover bids undermines management accountability and market vitality.

TIAA-CREF's international governance program involves both engagement with targeted portfolio companies and broad-based initiatives, often in conjunction with global governance organizations. We are willing to form strategic partnerships and collaborate with other institutional investors to increase our influence in foreign markets. We support regional efforts initiated by investor groups to improve local governance practices in line with global standards. We sponsor academic research, surveys and other activities that we believe will contribute to positive developments regionally.

In addition to maintaining a leadership role as an advocate for shareholder rights and good governance globally, TIAA-CREF is committed to voting our shares in international companies. Our trustees regularly update our international proxy voting policies and guidelines as new developments occur in the various markets. Our Proxy Voting Group is familiar with voting procedures in every country where we invest. We promote reforms needed to eliminate cross-border voting inefficiencies and to improve the mechanics of proxy voting globally.

We believe that basic corporate disclosure and proxy voting standards applicable to all public companies around the world should include the following:

- The one-share, one-vote principle should apply to all publicly traded companies to ensure that shareholders' voting power is aligned with their economic interest.
- Voting caps and super voting rights should be eliminated.
- Companies should treat all shareholders equally, equitably and fairly to ensure that minority and foreign shareholders are protected and that government-controlled securities are not given special rights.

- Companies should distribute disclosure documents in a timely fashion, preferably no less than 28 days before shareholder meetings so that international investors can make informed voting decisions and have sufficient time to vote their shares.
- Annual meeting agendas and disclosure documents should be published in English whenever a company has substantial international ownership.
- Companies should work to achieve transparency through disclosure and accounting practices that are acceptable under international governance and accounting standards.
- Companies should provide information on director qualifications, independence, affiliations, related party transactions, executive compensation, conflicts of interest and other relevant governance information.
- Shareholders should be able to vote their shares without impediments such as share blocking, beneficial owner registration, voting by show of hands or other unreasonable requirements.
- Shareholders should have the right to vote on separate and distinct issues; companies should not bundle disparate proposals.
- Voting results should be disclosed promptly after shareholder meetings and procedures should be available to audit and verify the outcome.
- Shareholders should receive confirmation that their votes have been received and tabulated.
- In addition, preemptive rights may have distinct value to shareholders in jurisdictions outside of the United States. For domestic companies, TIAA-CREF does not object to the elimination of preemptive rights, which can impede a company's ability to raise capital efficiently.

IX. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES

TIAA-CREF recognizes that as a matter of good corporate governance and from the perspective of shareholder value, boards should carefully consider the strategic impact of issues relating to the environment and social responsibility. There is a growing body of research examining the economic consequences of

companies' efforts to promote good environmental and social practices. We support companies' efforts to evaluate the strategic relevance of these factors, including their impact on business risk, reputation, competitive position and opportunities for growth.

TIAA-CREF believes that companies and boards should exercise diligence in their consideration of environmental and social issues, analyze the strategic and economic questions they raise and disclose their environmental and social policies and practices. Directors should encourage dialogue on these issues between the company and its investors, employees, customers, suppliers and the larger community. The goal of our policy is to ensure that the board and management include environmental and social responsibility in their business planning and that they disclose relevant information and decisions to shareholders.

While our policies are not intended to be prescriptive, we believe that companies and boards should pay careful attention to the following issues in the course of their strategic planning:

- **Environment:** the short-term and long-term impact of the company's operations and products on the local and global environment.
- **Human Rights:** the company's labor and human rights policies and practices and their applicability through the supply and distribution chains.
- **Diversity:** the company's efforts to promote equal employment opportunities and fair treatment for all segments of the populations it serves.
- **Product Responsibility:** the company's attention to the safety and potential impact of its products and services.
- **Society:** the company's diligence in reviewing all its activities to ensure they do not negatively affect the common good of the communities in which it operates.

Our guidelines for voting on some of the more common environmental and social resolutions are set forth in the Voting Guidelines included in Appendix A.

X. SECURITIES LENDING POLICY

TIAA-CREF believes that as a matter of good corporate governance shareholders have a responsibility to exercise their ownership rights with diligence and care. At the same time, however, institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to generate optimal financial returns for their beneficiaries. Balancing these two responsibilities — acting as responsible owners while maximizing value — can create a dilemma for institutional investors in choosing between short-term and long-term strategies. Stock lending practices can create such a potential conflict — whether to recall loaned stock in order to vote, or not to recall in order to preserve lending fee revenue.

To address these issues, TIAA-CREF has developed a securities lending policy governing its practices with respect to stock lending and proxy voting. The policy delineates the factors to be considered in determining when we should lend shares and when we should recall loaned shares in order to vote them.

Even after we lend the securities of a portfolio company, we continue to monitor whether income from lending fees is of greater value than the voting rights that have passed to the borrower. Using the factors set forth in our policy, we conduct an analysis of the relative value of lending fees versus voting rights in any given situation. We will recall shares when we believe the exercise of voting rights may be necessary to maximize the long-term value of our investments despite the loss of lending fee revenue.

Our Asset Management and lending staff, in consultation with our governance staff, are responsible for analyzing these issues, conducting the cost/benefit analysis and making determinations about restricting, lending and recalling securities consistent with this policy.

APPENDIX A: PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES

TIAA-CREF PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES

TIAA-CREF's voting practices are guided by our mission and fiduciary duty to our participants. As indicated in this Policy Statement, we monitor portfolio companies' governance, social and environmental practices to ensure that boards consider these factors in the context of their strategic deliberations.

The following guidelines are intended to assist portfolio companies, participants and other interested parties in understanding how TIAA-CREF is likely to vote on governance, compensation, social and environmental issues. The list is not exhaustive and does not necessarily represent how TIAA-CREF will vote at any particular company. In deciding how to vote, the Corporate Governance staff takes into account many factors, including input from our Asset Management Group and third-party research. We consider specific company context, including governance practices and financial performance. It is our belief that a one-size-fits-all approach to proxy voting is not appropriate.

We establish voting policies with respect to both management proposals and shareholder resolutions. Our proxy voting decisions with respect to shareholder resolutions may be influenced by several additional factors: (i) whether the shareholder resolution process is the appropriate means of addressing the issue; (ii) whether the resolution promotes good corporate governance and is related to economic performance and shareholder value; and (iii) whether the information and actions recommended by the resolution are reasonable and practical. In instances where we agree with the concerns raised by proponents but do not believe that the policies or actions requested are appropriate, TIAA-CREF will generally abstain on the resolution.

Where appropriate, we will accompany our vote with a letter of explanation.

GUIDELINES FOR BOARD-RELATED ISSUES

Policy Governing Votes on Directors:

TIAA-CREF will consider withholding or voting against some or all directors in the following circumstances:

- When TIAA-CREF trustees conclude that the actions of directors are unlawful, unethical, negligent, or do not meet fiduciary standards of care and loyalty, or are otherwise not in the best interest of shareholders. Such actions would include: issuance of backdated or spring loaded options, excessively dilutive equity grants, egregious compensation practices, unequal treatment of shareholders, adoption of inappropriate antitakeover devices, unjustified dismissal of auditors.

- When directors have failed to disclose, resolve or eliminate conflicts of interest that affect their decisions.
- When less than a majority of the company's directors are independent, by TIAA-CREF standards of independence.

In cases where TIAA-CREF decides to withhold or vote against the entire board of directors, we will also abstain or vote against a provision on the proxy granting discretionary power to vote on “other business” arising at the shareholders meeting.

Majority Vote for the Election of Directors:

General Policy: As indicated in Section III of this Policy Statement, TIAA-CREF will generally support shareholder resolutions asking that companies amend their governance documents to provide for director election by majority vote.

Proxy Access Proposals:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support shareholder resolutions seeking to establish reasonable conditions and procedures for shareholders to include their director candidates on a company's proxy and ballot.

Reimbursement of Expenses for Dissident Shareholder Nominees:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will consider on a case-by-case basis shareholder resolutions asking that the company reimburse certain expenses related to the cost of dissident short-slate director campaigns or election contests.

Annual Election of Directors:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support shareholder resolutions asking that each member of the board stand for re-election annually.

Cumulative Voting:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally not support proposals asking that shareholders be allowed to cumulate votes in director elections, as this practice may encourage the election of “special interest” directors.

GUIDELINES FOR OTHER GOVERNANCE ISSUES

Separation of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will consider on a case-by-case basis shareholder resolutions seeking to separate the positions of CEO and board chair or to appoint a lead director. We will generally support such resolutions when a company's corporate governance practices or financial performance are deficient.

Ratification of Auditor:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support the board's choice of auditor. However, TIAA-CREF will consider voting against the ratification of an audit firm where nonaudit fees are excessive, where the firm has been involved in conflict of interest or fraudulent activities in connection with the company's audit, or where the auditors' independence is questionable.

Supermajority Vote Requirements:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support shareholder resolutions asking for the elimination of supermajority vote requirements.

Dual-Class Common Stock and Unequal Voting Rights:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support shareholder resolutions asking for the elimination of dual classes of common stock with unequal voting rights or special privileges.

Antitakeover Devices (Poison Pills):

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will consider on a case-by-case basis proposals relating to the adoption or rescission of antitakeover devices with attention to the following criteria:

- Whether the company has demonstrated a need for antitakeover protection;
- Whether the provisions of the device are in line with generally accepted governance principles;
- Whether the company has submitted the device for shareholder approval;

- Whether the proposal arises in the context of a takeover bid or contest for control.

TIAA-CREF will generally support shareholder resolutions asking to rescind or put to a shareholder vote antitakeover devices that were adopted without shareholder approval.

Reincorporation:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally vote against management proposals asking shareholders to approve reincorporation to a new domicile if we believe the objective is to take advantage of laws or judicial interpretations that provide antitakeover protection or otherwise reduce shareholder rights.

GUIDELINES FOR COMPENSATION ISSUES

Equity-Based Compensation Plans:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will review equity-based compensation plans on a case-by-case basis, giving closer scrutiny to companies where plans include features that are not performance-based or where total potential dilution from equity compensation exceeds 10%.

Comment: TIAA-CREF understands that companies need to attract and retain capable executives in a competitive market for executive talent. We take competitive factors into consideration whenever voting on matters related to compensation, particularly equity compensation. As a practical matter, we recognize that more dilutive broad-based plans may be appropriate for human-capital intensive industries and for small- or mid-capitalization firms and start-up companies.

Red Flags:

- *Excessive Equity Grants:* TIAA-CREF will examine a company's past grants to determine the rate at which shares are being issued. We will also seek to ensure that equity is being offered to more than just the top executives at the company. A pattern of excessive grants can indicate failure by the board to properly monitor executive compensation and its costs.

- *Lack of Minimum Vesting Requirements:* TIAA-CREF believes that companies should establish minimum vesting guidelines for senior executives who receive stock grants. Vesting requirements help influence executives to focus on maximizing the company's long-term performance rather than managing for short-term gain.
- *Undisclosed or Inadequate Performance Metrics:* TIAA-CREF believes that performance goals for equity grants should be disclosed meaningfully. Performance hurdles should not be too easily attainable. Disclosure of these metrics should enable shareholders to assess whether the equity plan will drive long-term value creation.
- *Insufficient Executive Stock Ownership:* TIAA-CREF supports equity ownership requirements for senior executives and directors. Whether or not equity is a significant portion of compensation, sufficient stock ownership should be required to align executives' and board members' interests with those of shareholders.
- *Reload Options:* TIAA-CREF will generally not support "reload" options that are automatically replaced at market price following exercise of initial grants. Reload options can lead to excessive dilution and overgenerous benefits and allow recipients to lock in increases in stock price that occur over the duration of the option plan with no attendant risk.
- *Mega Grants:* TIAA-CREF will generally not support mega grants. A company's history of such excessive grant practices may prompt TIAA-CREF to vote against the stock plans and the directors who approve them. Mega grants include equity grants that are excessive in relation to other forms of compensation or to the compensation of other employees and grants that transfer disproportionate value to senior executives without relation to their performance.
- *Undisclosed or Inappropriate Option Pricing:* TIAA-CREF will generally not support plans that fail to specify exercise prices or that establish exercise prices below fair market value on the date of grant.
- *Repricing Options:* TIAA-CREF will generally not support plans that authorize repricing. However, we will consider on a case-by-case basis manage-

ment proposals seeking shareholder approval to reprice options. We are more likely to vote in favor of repricing in cases where the company excludes named executive officers and board members and ties the repricing to a significant reduction in the number of options.

- *Excess Discretion:* TIAA-CREF will generally not support plans where significant terms of awards — such as coverage, option price, or type of awards — are unspecified, or where the board has too much discretion to override minimum vesting and/or performance requirements.
- *Evergreen Features:* TIAA-CREF will generally not support option plans that contain evergreen features which reserve a specified percentage of outstanding shares for award each year and lack a termination date. Evergreen features can undermine control of stock issuance and lead to excessive dilution.

Performance-Based Equity Compensation:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support shareholder resolutions seeking alignment between executive compensation and performance.

Advisory Vote on Compensation Disclosure:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support shareholder resolutions seeking an advisory vote on companies' compensation disclosure.

Limits on Executive Compensation:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally vote against shareholder resolutions seeking to impose limits on executive pay by use of arbitrary ratios or pay caps.

Clawback Policies:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will vote on a case-by-case basis with respect to shareholder resolutions seeking the establishment of clawback policies.

Golden Parachutes:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support shareholder resolutions seeking shareholder approval of "golden parachute" severance agreements that exceed IRS guidelines.

Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will vote on a case-by-case basis with respect to shareholder resolutions seeking to establish limits on the benefits granted to executives in SERPs.

GUIDELINES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES

As indicated in Section IX, TIAA-CREF will generally support shareholder resolutions seeking reasonable disclosure of the environmental or social impact of a company's policies, operations or products. We believe that a company's management and directors have the responsibility to determine the strategic impact of environmental and social issues and that they should disclose to shareholders how they are dealing with these issues.

Environment

Global Warming and Climate Change:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support reasonable shareholder resolutions seeking disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions and the impact of climate change on a company's business activities.

Comment: The level of a company's greenhouse gas emissions and its vulnerability to climate change may represent both short-term and long-term potential risks. Companies and boards should analyze the impact of climate change on their business and disclose this information.

Use of Natural Resources:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support reasonable shareholder resolutions seeking disclosure or reports relating to a company's use of natural resources, the impact on its business of declining resources and its plans to improve energy efficiency or to develop renewable energy alternatives.

Comment: These considerations should be a part of the strategic deliberations of boards and managers and the company should disclose the results of such deliberations.

Impact on Community:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support reasonable shareholder resolutions seeking disclosure or reports relating to a company's initiatives to reduce any harmful community impacts or other hazards that result from its operations or activities.

Comment: Community hazards at business facilities may expose companies to such risks as regulatory penalties, legal liability, diminished reputation, increased cost and loss of market share. Conversely, the elimination of hazards may improve competitiveness and provide business opportunities.

Human Rights

Human Rights Code of Conduct and Global Labor Standards:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support reasonable shareholder resolutions seeking a review of a company's internal labor standards, the establishment of global labor standards or the adoption of codes of conduct relating to human rights.

Comment: Adoption and enforcement of human rights codes and fair labor standards can help a company protect its reputation, increase worker productivity, reduce liability, improve customer loyalty and gain competitive advantage.

Community

Corporate Response to Global Health Risks:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support reasonable shareholder resolutions seeking disclosure or reports relating to the potential impact of HIV, AIDS, Avian Flu and other pandemics and global health risks on a company's operations and long-term growth.

Comment: Global health considerations should be factored into the strategic deliberations of boards and managers, and companies should disclose the results of such deliberations.

Corporate Political Influence:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support reasonable shareholder resolutions seeking disclosure or reports relating to a company's lobbying efforts and contributions to political parties or political action committees.

Comment: Given increased public scrutiny of corporate lobbying activities and campaign contributions, we believe it is the responsibility of company boards to review and disclose the use of corporate assets for political purposes.

Corporate Philanthropy:

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support reasonable shareholder resolutions seeking disclosure or reports relating to a company's charitable contributions and other philanthropic activities. However, TIAA-CREF will vote against resolutions that promote a political agenda or a special interest or that unreasonably restrict a company's corporate philanthropy.

Comment: We believe that boards should disclose their corporate charitable contributions to avoid any actual or perceived conflicts of interest.

Diversity

General Policies:

- TIAA-CREF will generally support reasonable shareholder resolutions seeking disclosure or reports relating to a company's nondiscrimination policies and practices, or seeking to implement such policies, including equal employment opportunity standards.
- TIAA-CREF will generally support reasonable shareholder resolutions seeking disclosure or reports relating to a company's workforce diversity.
- TIAA-CREF will generally vote against special purpose or discriminatory resolutions, such as those recommending that sexual orientation not be covered under equal employment opportunity policies.

Comment: Promoting diversity and maintaining inclusive workplace standards can help companies attract and retain a talented and diverse workforce and compete more effectively.

Product Responsibility

General Policy: TIAA-CREF will generally support reasonable shareholder resolutions seeking disclosure or reports relating to the safety and impact of a company's products on the customers and communities it serves.

Comment: Companies that demonstrate ethical behavior and diligence with regard to product safety and suitability can avoid reputational and liability risks and strengthen their competitive position.

Tobacco

General Policies:

- TIAA-CREF will generally support reasonable shareholder resolutions seeking disclosure or reports relating to risks associated with tobacco use and efforts by a company to reduce youth exposure to tobacco products.
- TIAA-CREF will generally not support resolutions seeking to alter the investment policies of financial institutions or to require divestment of tobacco company stocks.

Comment: Effectively addressing these concerns can help companies protect their reputation and reduce legal liability risk.

730 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017-3206



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