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Professor Ernst Maug

Professor for Corporate Finance, Mannheim Business School
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Ernst Maug, Professor for Corporate Finance, Mannheim Business School, University of Mannheim
ECGI Research Associate (2002) :

Biography    
Ernst Maug has been professor for Corporate Finance at the University of Mannheim since February 2006. He was Professor of Business Administration at the Department of Business and Economics at the Humboldt-Universitšt zu Berlin.

In his previous positions he served as Assistant Professor of Finance at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University from 1996 to 2000. He held a similar position at the London Business School, where he taught from 1993 to 1996. He taught a range of courses from introductory MBA level to senior executive programs.

Professor Maug obtained his PhD from the London School of Economics in 1993, where he was a member of the Financial Markets Group.

His main research interest is in the theory of corporate finance with a particular emphasis on corporate governance. Recent work analyzes executive compensation contracts, the role of bankers on corporate boards, and shareholder voting. His research was published in the American Economic Review, the Journal of Finance, and the European Economic Review.

Research Interests
Corporate finance theory
Corporate governance

ECGI Working Papers (Click title for more details)
Labor Representation in Governance as an Insurance Mechanism ECGI Finance Working Paper 411/2014 September 2016
Pride and Prestige: Why Some Firms Pay Their CEOs Less ECGI Finance Working Paper 327/2012 March 2012
Indexing Executive Compensation Contracts ECGI Finance Working Paper 309/2011 June 2011
Restricting CEO Pay ECGI Finance Working Paper 291/2010 July 2010
How do Executives Exercise Their Stock Options? ECGI Finance Working Paper 284/2010 May 2010
Bankers on the Boards of German Firms: What they do, what they are worth, and why they are (still) there ECGI Finance Working Paper 196/2008 February 2008 Joint winner of the 2008 ECGI Best Paper Competition
Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation when Managers are Loss-Averse ECGI Finance Working Paper 193/2007 November 2007
Corporate Finance in Europe: A Survey ECGI Finance Working Paper 121/2006 March 2006
How Preussag became TUI: Kissing too many toads can make you a toad ECGI Finance Working Paper 058/2004 November 2004 Shared third prize in the 2004 Clinical Paper Competition
Lower Salaries and No Options: The Optimal Structure of Executive Pay ECGI Finance Working Paper 032/2003 November 2003 (revised April 2004)
Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules ECGI Finance Working Paper 031/2003 November 2003

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