click menu to expand		ECGI Research into Executive Remuneration This proprietary research examines the approaches taken across Europe to the regulation of executive pay practices in listed companies. The outstanding feature of the regulation of executive pay across Europe is the extent to which it reflects the interconnection between pay and corporate governance. Executive pay, regarded as a performance-based incentive contract, is a key agency-cost control mechanism in dispersed ownership systems. Legal controls on pay are accordingly at their most sophisticated, in terms of seeking to ensure the adoption of an optimal contract for shareholders, in those European countries where dispersed ownership dominates. In systems characterized by blockholding, controlling shareholders can, in theory, monitor management directly without the need for an incentive contract. Pay controls are accordingly less sophisticated. Concerns arise, however, as to the protection of minority shareholders. Contents: Working Paper: "Executive Remuneration in the EU: Comparative Law and Practice" by Professor Guido Ferrarini, University of Genoa and ECGI, Niamh Moloney of Queen’s University, Belfast and ECGI and Cristina Vespro of Université Libre de Bruxelles and ECGI. Answers to questionnaires sent out to experts in 15 EU member states (which formed the basis of the Working Paper) Denmark and Finland questionnaires. Consolidated answers for all 15 Member States Slide presentation: Executive Remuneration in the EU: Comparative Law and Practice given to the FESE European Financial Markets Convention in London on 13 June 2003 Full report on the ECGI session on Executive Remuneration at FESE's recent European Financial Markets Convention (Access restricted to ECGI members)