Methodology

This project has extended the work of the European Corporate Governance Network (ECGN) on corporate control in Europe to the Accession countries of the European Union, involving a primary data collection effort focusing on variables for which one would expect to find common (and high) disclosure standards deriving from the transposition and implementation of European securities regulations directives.

The project had two parts:

1. Assess the transposition and implementation of the relevant Directives, in particular the Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC) that provides for the disclosure of 10%+ voting blocks in listed companies.
2. Analyse the control of listed companies in Accession countries based on this disclosure standard, at least as a benchmark, and compare the results to those obtained for the European Union.

Research Results

See separate page for detailed results of the research

Policy Conclusions

Most Accession countries still need to fully transpose and implement the Large Holdings Directive. Interviews and meetings between the country teams and the responsible officials in the Accession countries suggest that more technical assistance is required in completing this task.

In terms of the concentration of voting power in listed companies, corporate control in Accession countries is comparable to corporate control in the European Union, with the notable exception of the United Kingdom. The debate on the benefits and costs of blockholders in the Union (and elsewhere) and the contrast between corporate governance in the United Kingdom and the other countries of the Union equally applies and extends to the Accession countries.

Organisation

See the country teams involved in this coordinated research programme

Project Output

• Country Research and Legislation
• Cross-Country Research Papers
• Related Research Papers

Sponsors

This project was sponsored by the European Commission (ACE Research Project 97-8042-R)

Further information from Marco Becht or Kate Millward at CEPR