The Control of Corporate Europe

Summary

This project has been undertaken by teams of researchers from the various countries investigated, and coordinated by the European Corporate Governance Network (ECGN) in 1996-98. The project relied on a common shareholder voting power disclosure standard adopted by the European Union (comparable to Section 13D-3 of the General Rules and Regulations promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the United States), the Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC).

The research found a very high degree of concentration of shareholder voting power in Continental Europe relative to the UK, and even concentration in the UK is still considerably higher than in the United States. The size of voting blocks in listed companies reflects particular features of company law, securities regulation and the need for stock market liquidity in the different European Union Member States. Under current European disclosure legislation, the cash-flow stakes associated with a given degree of voting power do not need to be disclosed. The conclusions stress the need for better European disclosure and the need to study the relationship between large controlling shareholders and weak minority shareholders, as well as the relationship between management and dispersed shareholders.

Organisation

See the country teams involved in this coordinated research programme

Project Output

• Book published by OUP (2001)
• Conferences (1997 and 1998)
• Policy Report to the European Commission (1997)
  

Sponsors

This project was sponsored by:

• Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), a non-profit foundation endowed by ENI (the Italian oil and gas company)
• The European Commission’s Directorate for Industry (DGIII)
• The Politecnico di Milano
  

Further information is available from Marco Becht