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01 August 2015  

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See the latest research from the ECGI published in the ECGI Finance Working Paper series
Mon, 08 Jun 2015 10:23 GMT  
ECGI Finance Working Paper 451/2015

by
Craig Doidge, University of Toronto George Andrew Karolyi, Cornell University René Stulz , Ohio State University (OSU), NBER and ECGI

Submitted by
René Stulz
Keywords:
listing, exchange, delisting, IPO, merger, public corporation, financial development

The U.S. had 14% fewer exchange-listed firms in 2012 than in 1975. Relative to other countries, the U.S. now has abnormally few listed firms given its level of development and the quality of its institutions. We call this the “U.S. listing gap” and investigate possible explanations for it. We rule out industry changes, changes in listing requirements, and the reforms of the early 2000s as explanations for the gap. We show that the probability that a firm is listed has fallen since the listing peak in 1996 for all firm size categories though more so for smaller firms. From 1997 to the end of our sample period in 2012, the new list rate is low and the delist rate is high compared to U.S. history and to other countries. High delists account for roughly 46% of the listing gap and low new lists for 54%. The high delist rate is explained by an unusually high rate of acquisitions of publicly-listed firms compared to previous U.S. history and to other countries.


to view details and download this Working Paper from the SSRN website

All ECGI Working Papers in the Law and Finance series are available on the ECGI website at www.ecgi.org/wp
See the latest research from the ECGI published in the ECGI Law Working Paper series
Fri, 15 May 2015 08:43 GMT  
ECGI Law Working Paper 293/2015

by
Brian Cheffins, University of Cambridge and ECGI

Submitted by
Brian Cheffins
Keywords:
corporate governance, boards of directors, takeovers, executive pay

While issues that prompt corporate governance responses are endemic to the corporate form, the term "corporate governance" only began to feature with any regularity in discussions of public companies in Britain as the 1990s got underway. It is well known that work done by the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, known as the Cadbury Committee, played a major role in fostering the rise of corporate governance in the U.K. at that point. This paper explains why corporate governance did not move into the spotlight in Britain in the 1970s, a development that might have been anticipated given that corporate governance was arriving on the scene in the United States then. The paper also identifies trends that likely would have ensured that corporate governance would have risen to prominence in Britain in the early 1990s in the absence of the Cadbury Committee’s deliberations.


to view details and download this Working Paper from the SSRN website

All ECGI Working Papers in the Law and Finance series are available on the ECGI website at www.ecgi.org/wp