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05 September 2015  

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See the latest research from the ECGI published in the ECGI Finance Working Paper series
Mon, 08 Jun 2015 10:23 GMT  
ECGI Finance Working Paper 451/2015

by
Craig Doidge, University of Toronto George Andrew Karolyi, Cornell University René Stulz , Ohio State University (OSU), NBER and ECGI

Submitted by
René Stulz
Keywords:
listing, exchange, delisting, IPO, merger, public corporation, financial development

The U.S. had 14% fewer exchange-listed firms in 2012 than in 1975. Relative to other countries, the U.S. now has abnormally few listed firms given its level of development and the quality of its institutions. We call this the “U.S. listing gap” and investigate possible explanations for it. We rule out industry changes, changes in listing requirements, and the reforms of the early 2000s as explanations for the gap. We show that the probability that a firm is listed has fallen since the listing peak in 1996 for all firm size categories though more so for smaller firms. From 1997 to the end of our sample period in 2012, the new list rate is low and the delist rate is high compared to U.S. history and to other countries. High delists account for roughly 46% of the listing gap and low new lists for 54%. The high delist rate is explained by an unusually high rate of acquisitions of publicly-listed firms compared to previous U.S. history and to other countries.


to view details and download this Working Paper from the SSRN website

All ECGI Working Papers in the Law and Finance series are available on the ECGI website at www.ecgi.org/wp
See the latest research from the ECGI published in the ECGI Law Working Paper series
Thu, 20 Aug 2015 13:26 GMT  
ECGI Law Working Paper 297/2015

by
Eilís Ferran, University of Cambridge and ECGI

Submitted by
Eilis Ferran
Keywords:
financial regulation, EU, governance

The European Banking Authority (EBA), an EU agency that works to ensure effective and consistent prudential regulation and supervision across the European banking sector as a whole, was established several years before the European Central Bank (ECB) became responsible for the prudential supervision of Euro area banks. The ECB’s assumption of supervisory responsibilities has prompted searching questions about whether the EBA can continue to add value. The EBA could function as the bridge between the ECB and the supervisory authorities of the remaining Member States and, as such, could help to preserve the integrity of the Single Market. This article locates the EBA’s prospects for success in this role more in its ability to manage co-existence than to direct the conduct of supervision. The inquiry is placed within lines of governance scholarship that have moved away from simple “command and control” models to more complex frameworks. The inquiry is supported by detailed examination of the EBA’s performance in key areas, including rule-making, interpretation, and stress testing. Close study reveals that the EBA cannot be expected significantly to prove its value on the supervisory side through its use of formal intervention powers because these powers are an uneasy fit with its hybrid structure and governance arrangements. This finding does not mean that the EBA is incapacitated: rather, the fact that its effectiveness relies more on facilitation than on threats suggests that the EBA is actually well-equipped to make progress in its unifying role.


to view details and download this Working Paper from the SSRN website

All ECGI Working Papers in the Law and Finance series are available on the ECGI website at www.ecgi.org/wp