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Working Paper Series in Law
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Title The Poison Pill In Japan: The Missing Infrastructure

Author(s) Ronald Gilson, Stanford Law School; Columbia Law School
Date January 2004
Serial No Law Working Paper No. 020/2004
Keywords hostile bids, European takeover directive, takeover defenses, voting rights, break-through rule, corporate control, poison pill, takeover debate in the U.S., monitoring of management, Delaware Law, indipendent directors, executive compensation, courts, ownership structure, Japanese Commercial Code, legal systems, Japanese corporate governance.
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