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Working Paper Series in Finance
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Title Can Strong Corporate Governance Selectively Mitigate the Negative Influence of 'Special Interest' Shareholder Activists? Evidence from the Labor Market for Directors

Author(s) Diane Del Guercio, University of Oregon and ECGI Tracie Woidtke, University of Tennessee
Date May 2017
Serial No Finance Working Paper No. 508/2017
Keywords Shareholder activism, market for directors, public pension funds, labor unions
Abstract From the SSRN website
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